How to find freedom in a chaotic world: Urza on anarcho-capitalism, dogma-free education and free thinking

Interested in the perspective of a man who systematically challenges the established order and offers bold alternatives to the way society works? That's what my third guest on the Talks 21 podcast, Urza, brings. The author of the first Czech book on anarcho-capitalism, founder and face of Freeport, teacher at the free school Ježek bez cage, columnist and strong promoter of the idea that absolute freedom begins with respect for property rights and self-ownership.

Together, we explored topics that affect each of us: what freedom means and where its limits lie, whether the state can offer absolute security, why democracy need not be a safeguard against totalitarianism, and the role of obedience and civil disobedience. We also discussed misinformation, education, technology, and artificial intelligence.

The most important thing that came out of the interview

• What is freedom

• How the state interferes in our lives

• Does the state offer absolute security or just an illusion

• What the death cycle of democracy looks like

• Why the fight against disinformation is a threat to freedom

• How deepfakes are changing our perception of reality

• What danger lies in obedience

• How free education can change the lives of children and parents

• Why anarcho-capitalism is an alternative to today's system

• Why the state fails when it tries to control everything

• Why today's technology puts us at the crossroads of civilisation

• What distinguishes current AI from accurate universal intelligence

• How can we use mathematics to prove the existence of a higher order

• Why learning itself is the most significant reason to live 

What is freedom

Karel:

Dear friends, welcome to another episode of Talks 21. Today's guest is

Urza. Urza is an anarcho-capitalist and anarcho-agorist author who works at the self-directed school Hedgehog Without a Cage. He founded and, together with his student Emma, created Freeport, an anarchist platform for exploring and spreading inner and outer freedom.

Let me start with something more general. How to define freedom? How to define external freedom?

Urza:

External freedom is a state where everyone respects my property rights. And when I say property rights, most people think of ownership of inanimate objects - like a table, a glass, a car, or a house. But when I talk about ownership, I mean ownership of my own body in particular. The moment no one interferes with my ownership, my external freedom is intact.

Of course, we then have inner freedom, and they are related in some way, but one of those freedoms is intact, while the other is restricted in some way.

Karel:

Often, external freedom is defined as the right of an individual to act according to their own convictions, provided that we don't interfere with the freedoms of other people.

But I see a weakness in this definition in what "not interfering with another person's liberties" actually means. After all, we are interconnected, and all our actions have an impact on others in some way.

This definition would, in effect, mean that freedom is almost nothing, because nearly everything interferes with the rights of others.

Urza:

In addition to what you said, the right to act according to one's own convictions. The problem is that those beliefs can be anything. That definition doesn't seem universal to me. For one thing, it's a bit cyclical, because you're relying on freedom in your definition of freedom. It's actually a circular definition.

It's the right to act on one's beliefs, yes. But the other part says, "as long as I'm not interfering with the freedom of other persons by doing so." And that's the problem - defining a term and then reusing it in that definition.

Karel:

The definition can make sense if it's iterative. It's not a direct circular definition, but rather a definition that refers to itself, albeit with specific other properties. That is, you can theoretically deduce the exact definition even if it's defined recursively. But that's a detail.

Urza:

It could be, but it's not entirely evident in this case. Because the moment two people have beliefs that go against each other, then what is their freedom? Because under the first part of the definition, one would be interfering with the other's freedoms, so it's de facto impossible. That's why I don't really like this definition.

Karel:

Yes, I agree. I was actually expecting that this definition is not entirely coherent, and you say a different one, through ownership structures. That's a fascinating perspective. And do you see any problems there after all?

We know that there are externalities, whether positive or negative. One can act freely, but one's actions have inevitable consequences, which can be of the nature of externalities.

Urza:

Those externalities can interfere with one's property rights, and if they interfere, they can interfere with freedom. That is, if I use my property in a way that harms someone else's property - and I need to emphasise again that when I say property, I don't just mean things, but primarily self-ownership, i.e., my own body - then that is no longer my freedom.

Because the moment I use my property in such a way that I damage, for example, someone else's body or even someone else's property, then at that moment it is no longer my freedom, because I am not respecting their property rights.

Karel:

Yes, I understand completely. My objection is to what it actually means to damage or to affect. Because we influence each other, even though the influence may not be substantial. Ultimately, almost everything we do is influenced by external factors.

A completely rigorous definition is complicated to follow. How can we distinguish whether there are externalities or not, when, moreover, some of them may be hidden?

Urza:

That's true, but those externalities can be divided into those that interfere with someone else's property and those that don't. When they interfere, they don't belong to freedom, and when they don't interfere, they belong to freedom. This means that externalities exist, of course. Still, according to this definition - and we are talking about external freedom now, because we also have internal freedom, which is something else - external freedom is a state in which nobody interferes with my property rights, even through externalities.

At that point, the definition is rigorous. However, there may be cases where I won't know. Someone can interfere with another's freedom without knowing it, and the one being interfered with may not even be aware of it. That can happen. It is an inevitable imperfection of the world, that the world is too complex and we don't have complete knowledge.

This means that there can be infringements of freedom unknowingly and from any quarter. However, it doesn't invalidate the definition per se; it simply shows that we don't know everything, have limited knowledge, and can't see all the implications.

Karel:

Yeah, cool. Let's say we have a consistent definition. However, in reality, we often do not know whether a given definition is satisfied or not. That's our life, after all - an iterative process complete with ignorance and incompleteness.

However, one thing follows from this definition: if freedom is indeed the highest value for us—and we agree philosophically on this—then, de facto, the state has no right to exist. Because the state interferes with our freedoms, and the question is by what right, whether rightfully or not. And that may be a topic we can explore.

How the state interferes in our lives

Urza:

That's why I'm an anarchist, because that's what I think too. There is, of course, the question of what we refer to as the state. If by that we mean an institution that provides services to people, then why not? But the important thing is that the institution operates voluntarily, whereas states are not. They force people not only to fund them, but also to comply with the wishes of the politicians or leaders of that state. And even if they don't restrict anyone. That's the main problem.

The institution interferes with people's freedoms when its leaders decide to make something illegal, even if that thing may not harm anyone and there may be no victim. They suddenly start interfering in other people's lives. And I think that's the classic "live and let live" that we all understand on an individual level. We know that if we're sitting in a mill, the mill has an owner, and he can basically do whatever he wants to do there, as long as he doesn't restrict anyone else.

If I came in and started telling him how to run his mill, everybody would say, "You're not serious, Urza, that's completely absurd, why would you tell him how to run his mill?" But the moment the government does the same, people suddenly start saying: "Yeah, miller, you have to run your mill the way the government says, otherwise you're a bad person."

That's actually a reversal of the same view. If I come in and start telling the miller how to run his mill, then I'm the weird one who's interfering with his rights. However, when the government does the same thing, the miller is suddenly supposed to be the odd one out because he doesn't comply, which is weird. And, of course, it's a cognitive dissonance that most people experience.

Does the state offer absolute security or just an illusion

Karel:

The state is an institution that claims to be there for the people and wants to help them. One of these proclaimed theses, for example, is that the state will offer more security. And that is supposed to be the reason why we should make any sacrifices or compromises regarding the state. How do you perceive these greater certainties from the state?

Urza:

It depends. In some ways, the state may offer greater certainties, but in many ways, it provides a more illusionary sense of certainty. We see this when we examine history - the state provides some certainty, but it only lasts so long before it is violated. And when it does break it, it can then always justify why it was necessary.

Moreover, we are encouraged to do this from a young age, through the education system, society, the media, and public spaces. Everything is strongly set up to defend the state and the government, regardless of who is in power. People may think this government is better than another, but in general, they are somehow geared to tolerate the state for almost anything.

So, the state will offer certain assurances, but when it decides otherwise, it will justify very well why those assurances no longer apply. And people go along with it - partly out of inertia, because they have been taught to do so, and partly because they still believe that they actually have the guarantees. This is paradoxical because the state continues to take them away. And in the specific things it promises, it may break its promises, but it leaves the people alone. As opposed to when a promise is broken by a private entity - a person or a company. There, we immediately say, "No, this is not OK." However, when the state does the same thing, it starts defending it.

Karel:

This cry for certainty is actually a disease of modern times. We live in a world, a natural world, where certainties cannot exist. And the fact that people want certainties that in reality they absolutely cannot have, and then someone starts promising them and offering them, leads to a crazy degeneration.

The moment we give the state this apparent legitimacy, we only reinforce its power and strength. Thus, it is rational for the state to support and maintain this power. For example, the state legitimately divides society, because a divided society is the one that is easiest to control.

What the death cycle of democracy looks like

Urza:

I might say that democracy also divides society. Because the moment we have democracy and, of course, it works through the state, it actually means that the majority can outvote the minority. And people with an opinion that differs from mine are not a problem for me as long as it's just their opinion. The problem comes the moment their opinion can cause someone to use physical force to force me to live in accordance with that opinion. That is already a threat to me. And it's visible throughout society.

What you said about security, I call the death cycle of democracy. It is that the state creates people who are dependent on the state, and then they vote for an increasingly paternalistic state. Let's say you get politicians who start promising guarantees: "We'll take care of you, we'll protect you from something." And even if they do deliver and protect people to some extent, they must also employ more civil servants at the

same time. And these are more people who become dependent on the state.

So gradually, the wheels are turning, where on the one hand, there are more and more people who are dependent on the state, either for its protection, help, or support, or directly because the state provides for them, as they work as those who provide that protection and assistance. Politicians are hiring more and more people to implement their programmes. And these people then logically tend to vote for other politicians who, in turn, offer more influence and protection from the state. They get elected, they hire more civil servants, and the state exercises a bit more control.

Unfortunately, this has a positive feedback loop - negative for us, but positive in the sense that the more people are dependent on the state, the more likely they are to vote for politicians who deepen that dependence. And the more such politicians come to power, the more people become dependent on the state they create.

And that, I think, is what happens in all so-called liberal democracies. If you look at all of them, there is no exception - they differ in the speed at which it happens. In Switzerland, for example, the process occurs relatively slowly, whereas in France, it happens relatively quickly. However, in principle, no liberal democracy is moving towards a smaller state; they are all moving towards socialism and a bigger and bigger state.

Karel:

Well, in that sense, the term "liberal democracy" has actually been misused to convey a completely different meaning today.

Urza:

Yes, I'm using it more as a terminus technicus - that is, it's commonly referred to as.

Karel:

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say 'libertarian.'

Urza:

Definitely not libertarian, but it's said - I mean, it's about democracy in the Western world, in our civilisation, in Europe.

Karel:

For me, it's not libertarian.

Urza:

I agree. For me, it's democracy, because I think that describes it quite accurately. It's not liberal, but it's called that. I mean countries within our civilisational framework, such as Western Europe, America, or NATO countries. It's not precisely defined, but if you look at them, all these countries are moving towards more state control, more socialism, greater dependence on the state, and more legislative intervention in people's lives. And there's not one exception, which shows that that's a feature of the system.

Karel:

I perceive that the system is collapsing. The system of Western civilisation is actually degenerating and heading towards collapse. It will have to change somehow. And it's also up to us where it leads and what happens next.

Urza:

I'm hesitant to confirm the prophecies of collapse because I've heard so many of them that I'm unsure which one to believe. I don't dare to say what exactly it means - whether it will lead to collapse or whether it may lead to some form of, let's say, totalitarianism.

Karel:

Well, collapse is a radical change, and it can also result in some form of totalitarianism, which is the worst-case scenario.

Urza:

It can be the other way around. People often perceive that totalitarianism is the opposite of democracy, but I don't think that's the case. The opposite of democracy is a dictatorship, while totalitarianism may very well be democratic.

The primary difference is that totalitarianism is a state in which the state intervenes in virtually every aspect of its citizens' lives. In contrast, dictatorship is a form of government in which one ruler holds absolute power. However, because the two often go hand in hand and the dictator implements totalitarianism, people tend to confuse the terms, even though they are two different things.

So often, people say they are fighting totalitarianism for democracy. But they are not the same thing. When they are for democracy, they are opposing dictatorship, which means that there is a rotation of who rules, and there is not just one ruler. But that doesn't mean that democracy is the opposite of totalitarianism. In fact, we can also arrive at totalitarianism the democratic way - by electing totalitarian rulers and more and more control. And that is what is happening.

I'm not saying that we live in totalitarianism now. It doesn't even have a hard limit. But we're definitely moving in that direction.

Why the fight against disinformation is a threat to freedom

Karel:

We're moving in that direction. And one of the signs is this. I want to ask the following: What do you consider the biggest threat to the existence of disinformation today?

Urza:

That's an interesting question. The most significant danger of disinformation is that it is addressed through the state.

Karel:

Exactly. It's the fight against misinformation.

Urza:

Yeah, but it also depends on the form of that fight. Because there can certainly be legitimate forms of fighting disinformation. And then there's the question of what "fighting disinformation" actually means. I can fight it, for example, by informing.

Karel:

I'm not saying every fight. I mean the struggle that is being waged today.

Urza:

Actually, yes, because trying to protect people from the effects of misinformation is counterproductive. The more we create a world where misinformation is not allowed to appear, the more people rely on everything they read being true.

However, the real resilience of society must come from the individual, not from the top. If individuals can assess what they read, verify sources, and critically evaluate them, then the whole society is more resilient to such influences. But the moment we try to ban information from the top - ban it from the source - we weaken the ability of people to learn to recognise for themselves which information is relevant and which is not.

It is one thing to have completely false misinformation, but then there are the much smarter ones, and I'm not sure if you can even call them misinformation. Because it can also contain accurate information, but it only shows part of the truth, which forms the basis for the whole story in one's mind. But it may not correspond to reality at all, or it may only correspond to part of it. And I don't think this can be addressed by writing a law or telling Facebook to label it.

Karel:

I agree. The argument for the need to fight misinformation tends to be that the majority of people are uneducated, stupid, don't know what to think, are being manipulated, and we're going to lose our democracy and our freedom. This justifies the need to set the record straight or ban misinformation.

For me, this argument is entirely misguided. I am not saying that there is no danger of disinformation, but, as you said, if we want to ban it, who will be the arbiter? Who will decide what is disinformation and what is not? There is simply no such principle. And by not existing, there will inevitably be abuse. If we establish a regulation to limit information and disinformation, it will eventually fall under the control of someone who will begin to abuse it.

And if it is true that people are susceptible to misinformation and cannot defend themselves, then we are sure to lose everything - especially our freedom. But if we go out on a limb and don't ban disinformation, but instead try to make people resilient, so that they can understand and sort information, then we at least have a chance. We don't have certainty, but at least we have a chance.

Urza:

I certainly don't want to dispute that there is some risk of misinformation. There is definitely misinformation. And certainly a lot of it is dangerous and harmful in some way.

Karel:

And I used to feel that the risk was greater. People are more resilient nowadays.

Jak deepfake mění naše vnímání reality

Urza:

Yeah, but the more resilient people are, it's because they're exposed to it and they're learning to deal with it. In one debate, I was asked, and there were Pirates there, "Urza, if you were on our side, how would you fight deepfakes?" And I said, "If I were in your position, I would fight back by reaching out to all my colleagues, politicians and celebrities and asking them if it's OK for me to make some completely absurd deepfake video with them. And then I would flood the whole internet with it." And people would learn to recognise it.

This is the only effective way to combat deepfakes and misinformation - by not leading people to believe that everything they read is true, but instead letting them question what they do or don't believe for themselves.

And yes, I'm sure there will be a generation that will have a problem with that, because it's a generational issue. Like, for example, certain generations believed that what was written in the newspaper was true because it had to be verified. I recall a conversation with my grandfather in which the newspaper mentioned something about my classmate and the situation I was in. And my grandfather believed it. I was telling him, "I was there." And he said, "But it's in the paper." I said, "I was there." And he said, "It was written here, that's what it was." And this is an older generation issue - that if it's in the newspaper, it's true.

Karel:

That's changed, too.

Urza:

That's changed, but many people still believe chain emails and similar messages - just because it's written in black and white, they assume it's true. And now the next generation will come, maybe ours, who won't completely believe what's just written, but when they see it in a video, they're more likely to accept it.

Karel:

But they've learned their lesson that it's a deepfake.

Urza:

Yeah, but I'm sure there's going to be a generation of people again who are like, "This is written, this could be any bullshit, but here I saw it in a video, so I believe it because they showed it to me." However, when the next generation comes along, having watched deepfake videos since they were kids, around ten years old, they will perceive them in the same way we perceive written text today. They'll think, "Anybody could have generated that, anything could have been there."

Karel:

Because what we're getting back to with technology is that what you can really trust is what you personally experience. And also personal communication. What they see or read, as well as what they see on video, can be de facto arbitrary. In a way, it's a good thing that it pushes us back to personal communication.

Urza:

Maybe I hadn't thought of that. And I'm not sure if that's a good thing or a bad thing. Face-to-face communication has its advantages and disadvantages. I certainly wouldn't say that face-to-face communication is generally better or worse than online communication. Each has its time and place. It's a different ratio for each person, which works for them. And I can see that with myself - I'm certainly not one to say that only online or only live communication is excellent. Instead, I look for what ratio between online and face-to-face communication works for me.

Karel:

I'm not saying that either, of course, but I'm more pointing out that there's a definite comeback. After all, face-to-face communication is regaining importance again, as almost everything has moved online. This certainly has enormous advantages, but it also has its weaknesses.

We observe that the state and its regulations are growing. It is, after all, one of the laws of the evolution of civilisations. You probably know Miroslav Barta's book. One of the indicators of the collapse or decline of a civilisation is the insane growth of bureaucracy, the expansion of the state, and control.

If we want to counteract this, we have to realise that society evolves in some way, and civilisation evolves. Then, there will be a collapse or a conflict, which may lead to war. This will collapse everything, people will suffer and start again, more effectively. Bureaucracy is still reasonable at the beginning, and more defensible. And then it gradually grows.

Well, what about it? We are now in a situation where states are, dare I say, rather pompous - we agree on that. There are numerous nonsensical laws in place today. As far as written law is concerned, there are even an order of magnitude, maybe two orders of magnitude more today than there were a hundred years ago. Nobody can make sense of them any more. Moreover, many of the standards and regulations that the state requires are contrary to morality. And you're a proponent of something called civil disobedience. Please tell us more about that.

What danger lies in obedience

Urza:

You called it civil disobedience; I'm talking about disobedience in general. Yes, obedience is a problem we have as a civilisation and as humanity in general.

When we examine the stories we tell, there's often a motif that disobedience leads to misfortune: a child disobeyed his parents, went up a cliff and fell, a little boy cried wolf, and eventually died because of his disobedience. These stories spread among people to reinforce the importance of obedience.

But we ignore the fact that the vast majority of terrible things in history - wars, genocides, and the like - are the result of obedience, not disobedience. People have died in wars, in communist and Nazi regimes, and these regimes indeed caused it. But all of this was only possible because there were people who obeyed. They obeyed the orders of their superiors, did not question them, and carried them out because they felt it was important or necessary.

In my opinion, it is obedience that has killed more people than anything else in human history. It's at the top of the list of things behind violent killing, and it's been with us since ancient times. We are constantly being told that "this time it's important", that now is the time to obey. You hear before every election that this is the most critical election. It's still the turning point in civilisation when you have to "do something" - typically vote for someone, or stop thinking for yourself and fall in with the herd.

Once we switch into that herd effect, it's hard to get out of it. And when one becomes an absolute supporter of a party, one stops seeing the positives and negatives of different perspectives and focuses on a single truth. I think that's extremely dangerous because it's so easy to abuse.

Karel:

I agree with that. Indeed, breaking the law is often defensible, desirable, and rarely heroic.

You may have some specific examples - I do too - where disobedience is actually a courageous act against totalitarian rule.

One such example, for me, is what happened during the COVID pandemic. De facto doctors, especially in Germany, were willing to issue a so-called vaccination certificate, that is, a certificate that someone had been vaccinated against the disease. All in all, the pressure and manipulation that people have to be vaccinated is in itself a fundamental violation of the principle of freedom. And the worst thing of all was the vaccination of children.

However, some people dealt with it at the time by having fake IDs. And in Germany, it was downright criminal. I consider the courage of a doctor to go against the system and issue a phoney vaccination against COVID to be a courageous, even heroic act. In our country, the penalties were not so harsh.

This is the only way to prevent us from ending up with complete and total control.

Urza:

I have it somehow differently. I'll answer the question first, and then I'll also comment on what you said. First, pressure alone is not a violation of freedom. Coercion is, but interpersonal pressure is not. You can think what you want about it, but it's not an infringement of liberty in itself. As long as there isn't a consequence, a sanction, then everyone can choose - for example, I only want to be among the vaccinated, and I'm letting the unvaccinated know I don't like it. I've done no such thing, but it's legitimate for me.

But the sanction was there. And that's why I'd be dividing it up. You said that the pressure was already a violation of freedom, but interpersonal pressure, to me at least, doesn't yet violate that external freedom. Sanctions already do. And it depends on how it's set up—the way it's been set up here, certainly not. But I can imagine another way it could be consistent with freedom.

For example, in free-market healthcare and free-market health insurance companies. They could contractually require their clients to get vaccinated. And of course, anyone who didn't want to wouldn't have to be a client. They can leave.

Karel:

Yes, exactly. And so can a restaurant that requires drapes.

Urza:

That's precisely what I think, too - that it should have been the responsibility of each individual. A restaurant can be open, closed, or have drapes or not have drapes. Each person should decide that for themselves.

On the other hand, it seems to me that regarding COVID - and I know that's how the vast majority of people feel - it's taken as an example of insane totalitarianism. It's just one of the little drops of what the state has been doing; it's suddenly become more visible and impactful. However, the state does things like this fairly often.

Karel:

Provide examples, as COVID-19 is obvious. There's something that's filtered through to people, and they can see into other areas because of that filter.

How free education can change the lives of children and parents

Urza:

It's good to see, but the state does much worse things. For example, when I focus on education, the education system is one of the biggest wrongs. The state accredits the schools that can teach, and then they have to operate according to its requirements. There is a national education program, and it is explicitly stated in the program that every teacher must lead students to the values of the state, including democratic values, and demonstrate the benefits of democracy and the state.

Just look at those documents. It used to be the White Paper, which was more patriotic and democratic; now it is the 2030 strategy, which is more Euro-integrative. In any case, it is contradictory - on the one hand, it advocates for critical thinking, which is what we are supposed to lead people to, but at the same time, it clearly outlines the values we are supposed to lead them to. And that's a contradiction in terms: either I'm leading people to values or I'm teaching them to think critically.

Karel:

We can do both. For example, it is crucial to lead children to develop the ability to reason - that is, to learn mathematics, think logically, and argue effectively. That's one key component.

The other is to lead them to freedom and independence, allowing them to realise what they actually want individually. To open up to their mission, their intuition and their own life.

Urza:

That's what a child finds best, the moment you let them.

Karel:

Yes, I don't know how to do it, but this should be the goal.

Urza:

The moment I say that I'm guiding a child towards some values - democratic values, for example - I'm actually weakening their critical thinking. Critical thinking means that the child chooses whether or not to accept those values. If I am obliged to teach him to think critically, but at the same time to instil specific values in him, then the two tasks are contradictory.

Karel:

OK, maybe not "guide" but instead open the way to self-knowledge. These are psychological methods that provide information or reveal new horizons to a person who is unaware of them, without manipulation. This is an excellent line. If we want to open up the child's ability to think and find their own way of life, what they really want, then the question is how to do it in such a way that we do it independently and don't instil something of our own, as you say.

Urza:

I think that when you say that the foundation is logical thinking and mathematics, that's something that maybe you and I agree on, because we're mathematicians. However, many people will have a different perspective. And it's important to respect that - not to assign this view of ours to others, even to the opinions of these kids.

And to get back to the answer to your question, education as the state practises it —that is, learning to listen and accept everything without discussion —iss insane to me. What I consider heroic are the people who can set up a school in this system and disrespect those fundamentals. The kids there are functioning in a completely different way than the state requires or would like. Such schools exist and are being created - and I work at one of them.

Karel:

These are so-called free schools.

Urza:

They're not entirely free, we'd like to be, but they're not for adults because we have to deal with the administration towards the state. But for children, they are free. And for me, the founder of the school where I work is a hero, because she founded it with the intention of running it the way she thinks is right—not the way the Ministry of Education believes is right.

Karel:

What can I say? The style of teaching as it is promoted and implemented in mainstream schools is fundamentally flawed. Teaching children to memorise things and to demonstrate knowledge just by learning patterns makes no sense at all.

Urza:

It doesn't. However, what comes instead addresses some of the symptoms, but not the primary issue. Yes, we can have one level - the child learns poems by rote and similar concepts. Second level - the child understands something, not just repeats it. That's certainly better, but it's still not the path to freedom. It's more of a way of instilling specific competencies.

There is still a lack of respect for the person to seek their own freedom, happiness, and life - even if they are still young. To do it knowing that he will make mistakes and be wrong about it. To let him make mistakes, because that's the only way he can find it for himself.

The moment I tell him what to do - when to learn math, when to learn Czech, when to learn English, when to learn anything - it may be more effective in terms of teaching methods for each subject, but he won't have his education or his life in his hands. And the most valuable thing he can learn is to take responsibility for his life and his education. Even at the cost of not doing it optimally, of making a mistake - but then learning from that mistake.

Karel:

I totally agree with you. But at the same time, as adults, we have experience, we know what has worked and what hasn't, so it makes sense to offer children what works - games, different kinds of activities and so on. We don't have to leave it all up to the children to figure it out; we can show them the way.

And again, it goes back to the subtlety of not manipulating.

Urza:

It's more like the child takes the necessary instructions by himself, because he naturally copies the behaviour of adults. I don't have to offer him things from my life purposely - he sees them anyway. And by living with him, I automatically give him the best and worst of myself. He watches me and takes what he needs from it.

So I don't have to think about what instructions I'll come up with to get him somewhere. I'm just living my life and affecting everyone around me, including the kids. Of course, that doesn't mean ignoring them - when a child comes in and needs something, it's essential to be there for them. It certainly is. But I'm more of an advocate of not trying to push him somewhere.

What works for me - logical reasoning, logical thinking, and math may not work for everyone. There are other options, and they may be better suited for some individuals. It's up to people to find their way. They can draw inspiration from someone who thinks logically and does math, but they can also find inspiration elsewhere and take a completely different path. That might not involve mathematics at all, or it might affect it later.

Karel:

I understand. On the other hand, the ability to undergo some logical training - to understand what an implication or a reverse implication is - gives a person, if they put in some effort, the ability to argue and debate logically. And that's desirable and should be a basic education for every person.

I understand that, for further development, each person has to choose the path that is best for them, whether artistic or otherwise. However, I certainly wouldn't disregard logic.

It makes sense to communicate what really works, and it also makes sense to try to connect the dots as much as possible. It's different for each person; it depends on what weight they give to what. On one side is rationality, and on the other is intuition and the emotions that can follow.

Urza:

It's challenging for me to take a clear stance on this. I'll agree with you, as I'm following a very similar path to yours. That said, a combination of logic and a balance of emotion and intuition works for me as well. It feels like the right path to me, and that's why I've taken it.

However, what I'm talking about is respecting the fact that what works for me may not work for someone else. Because everything has an opportunity cost. When I say "come learn the basics of what I think is right," it also means that they won't learn something else. Everything one does has a cost - if one does one thing, one cannot do another thing at the same time.

It works for me, and by living with and being in contact with the child, he sees for himself the benefits and drawbacks. And I'm happy to pass that on. But the moment he decides he doesn't want to go that way, he wants it different, he doesn't want to learn even the basics, I tend to respect that. Because who am I to say, "No, this way is wrong."

Karel:

On the other hand, we're adults, and children are playing; they're not themselves yet. That means that part of our responsibility is to show and offer them that path. Sure, it's a question of degree. My approach is that it may still depend on the individual child. Some children are expressly suited to free schools, in the sense that they create their own work and learning. However, some children require more guidance.

Urza:

I don't have that experience - and I have an awful lot of kids around me who have come into contact with that kind of thing. The longer an educator is in a traditional school, the more certain they are that our way can't work. Because he's accustomed to forcing the children to learn as he sees fit—and they logically resist precisely because they have to.

The moment the pressure is gone, the counter-pressure is gone. That's why kids in traditional school often don't want to do Czech or math and would rather play Minecraft or soccer. It's not because Czech and maths are a chore on their own, and Minecraft and football are fun. It's because someone is forcing them into Czech and maths - and that creates resentment.

In our school, kids can do whatever they want. If someone wants to play Minecraft from morning till night, no one will tell them, "Go learn math." Yet, there are lessons in maths, Czech, languages, and other subjects - and children attend them voluntarily. They don't have to, they're not graded, they don't face any sanctions. And they go anyway because nobody forces them to.

The bottom line is that when you teach a lesson in a school like that, you have to make it more interesting than computer games, chatting with friends, and anything else a kid might do instead. And they still go. Because no one forced them, they don't even feel that math or Czech is a chore.

And the result? We have exactly zero illiterate kids - not counting the very young ones now, like six-year-olds who just haven't had time to learn. They all learn to read, write, and basic math, even though no one forces them to, or instructs them, or threatens them. The result of this is 100%.

And why is that? Because they need it, they find their own way to it. If we look at the experience of traditional schools, we might say, "This can't work." Yes - it doesn't work on the kids you force. But it does work on the ones you give the choice to.

Karel:

Yes, I understand your argument. For kids who have already gone through the pressure and built up resistance, that path may be closed. Or is it?

Urza:

It is not closed. We have a lot of those kids, too. Typically, people say, "Oh, you're the choice school so that you can afford it." And yes, sometimes that's true - really free-thinking parents will put their kid in with us. But it happens at least as often that so-called "uneducable" or "problem" children come to us. These are the ones who've been through, say, six elementary schools, received B's and F's, and now they're figuring out what to do with their lives - whether to go to juvenile hall or something similar.

Sometimes, when parents are desperate, they come in with a kid, and they say, "It doesn't work." And we tell them, "OK, if you're OK with it, we're not going to force him to do anything." That's something we have to be very clear with them - that it works differently for us. That doesn't mean he's going to start working right away, but rather that we're going to let him be.

We have a lot of kids like that. They're often victims of bullying, autistic kids, kids on a different spectrum, or just the "problem" kids. They tend to be very suspicious at first, testing boundaries - like whether it's really okay if they don't come to class and do nothing. It takes them a while. It's individual. It could be a year or two or more, but usually not. And eventually it works for them too. After a while, they reawaken their natural curiosity, which the pressure of the classical schools has completely killed.

Karel:

That's good news. How do you imagine the ideal functional society? We are aware of anarcho-capitalism, a theory that originated several hundred years ago. Or when did anarcho-capitalism actually come about?

Why anarcho-capitalism is an alternative to today's system

Urza:

In the mid-20th century. One thing is anarchy, and another thing is anarcho-capitalism. The first anarchists were probably as old as the first kings. And the first extant and recorded anarchist was Lao Tzu, who lived several hundred years BC. Then came the great flowering of anarchism in the 19th century, which was actually a reaction to the nationalist tendencies of the time. In the 19th century, education was based on the idea that the nation was the highest value, that the individual was not important, and that the greatest virtue was to get killed in a war for one's country.

Anarchism was very much on the rise at that time. Among other things, anarcho-individualism developed, which said that the most outstanding value was not the nation but the individual. One thing is national ideals, and another is what a particular individual wants. And it was anarchoindividualism, combined with the Austrian school of economics, that came together to form anarcho-capitalism, as described by Murray Newton Rothbard in the mid-20th century.

Karel:

Anarcho-capitalism had already developed theoretically well, even without the technologies we have today. It's just that we have fantastic communication technologies today. The amazing thing is, for example, asymmetric encryption has a huge philosophical underpinning of freedom. Because of this, we can have an objective record that cannot be challenged, which was not previously possible. You could always forge everything - documents, records, and so on. But blockchain technology does not allow forgery.

And that to me is a massive boost to this theory. Because it is in the light of these modern technologies that anarcho-capitalism should be even more precise and far more implementable than it was, say, a hundred years ago.

Urza:

It is, and there are more and more proponents of this current. We may still be in a small minority, but there are more and more of us, and it's making sense to an increasing number of people. I'm not saying we're not still a small fraction of the population, but that fraction is growing.

Karel:

But you are growing, and that's important. For example, I perceive that the state, or rather the whole of Western civilisation, is undergoing a degeneration that is heading towards collapse. This is manifested, among other things, by the fact that the state is becoming less and less functional. This is linked to the regulations and nonsensical regulations that are constantly being created. We can see this, for example, in the case of Spain, where an electricity blackout has occurred. We can expect similar phenomena—power cuts, logistics problems, and so on—to intensify.

This demonstrates, as it has on more than one occasion in history, that the state has reached a stage of dysfunction and will need to be replaced in some way. Historically, this has often meant conflict or war, from which only a select segment of society has been able to emerge. But today we have a chance to do better. That the fall may not be a brutal hit on concrete, but rather a hit on a trampoline from which we can bounce.

However, to do that, we need to be able to substitute the state gradually. Not by revolution and destroying structures that still work, but by creating alternative groups, communication networks and mutually supportive communities. These are already partially replacing the state today and will assume more and more of its role as the problems escalate.

How do you see this? Do you have an example of organisations that are already functioning in this way? Or else, how do we connect people to achieve just that softer impact instead of falling on concrete?

Urza:

For example, the school I mentioned is one such organisation, and there are more schools like it. However, there's also what you mentioned yourself: cryptography and the broader crypto-community. There are a lot of cryptoanarchists today, which is something that used to be practically non-existent. There are a lot of them nowadays, and they are working towards a certain, let's say, independence - especially financial independence. While all the money in the world today, including the classic fiat currencies, has a central authority that can control it, suddenly, there is decentralised money that doesn't need any authority to function. And this is actually a huge revolutionary breakthrough.

There are a number of these paths. Creating parallel structures independent of the state is essential—and technology is making it easier and easier. People can do things their own way and say, "We don't need the state, we'll do it our way." However, that's something the state obviously doesn't want to see, and opting out of it can be very problematic, sometimes even impossible. On the other hand, people do opt out, even though the law forbids them to do so.

That is, there are plenty of people who are doing something different from what the state would like them to do—something the state regulates. It ranges from the tiny things, such as someone running a business and setting the standards and rules they believe are right, even if they are against the law, to larger issues. Yet that person continues to participate in the broader economy. Or the state bans drugs - and yet some people will produce them. Or the state tries to regulate guns, and people who want to defend themselves will find a way; maybe someone will figure out how to print a gun on a 3D printer. With every regulation and restriction that the state imposes, some people explore ways to circumvent it.

Which, of course, doesn't always have to be all positive, but for me, it's still the way to go. It doesn't make sense to go to politicians and beg them to make better laws. It makes much more sense to me to realise which laws I will obey and which I won't. Everything has consequences, but often those consequences are much smaller than people imagine. Many people are intimidated at first, thinking, "It's in the law, so I have to follow it." But that's precisely the condition that the state wants us to accept.

But when I think about it, what does it actually mean that the law is telling me something? Does Babiš, Fiala, or anyone else think it is right? Are these the people I go to for advice? No, they are not. Are they people whose opinion really matters to me? No, they are not. I want to create my own reality, together with people I trust. And I will seek advice from those I respect, not from those who have come to power through political marketing.

And that's when I get the power to decide which laws I will obey and why, which ones I won't follow, and what happens if I don't obey them. I can experiment with it, explore where the line is, and how far I can go. And it's often possible to go much further than I would have expected. Because the state gives the impression that it can't - because it's in its interest, but often it can be done, and sometimes very easily.

That's why I find it more functional not to think about persuading politicians to change the laws, but to look for ways to live in an environment where the rules are set the way they are - even if there are penalties for doing so. And at the same time, I can connect with people who share similar views and think together about how to make it work.

And I don't mean hurting people, of course. That makes a huge difference. There's a difference between the state banning things that actually harm others, such as murder or theft, and banning many things that don't hurt anyone, except at most the person themselves. And it's those things that are important to explore and find ways to do them in our own way. Do I want to approach children differently from the usual way? Then I'll do it. Do I want to educate children in a way that differs from the state-approved approach? Then I look for a way to do it anyway.

Why the state fails when it tries to control everything

Karel:

I totally agree. That's one aspect of it - the limiting of state influence. However, there's another aspect, which is the functionality of the state itself. As we've been talking, I'm concerned that the state is failing more and more and that problems are inevitable. That is why it is essential that we can connect beyond the state. When problems arise, we will need to be able to help each other at an individual level, thereby partly replacing what the state should be doing.

Urza:

Central planning doesn't work. Or it may give the impression that it works in the short term, but more likely only by accident. And the state is failing precisely because it is trying to manage an increasing number of things. It fails the more it intervenes. Before 1989, the state dominated the entire economy, and the result was a massive failure, visible at every turn. A typical example of this is the "little" thing that there was no toilet paper.

Karel:

However, it had the advantage that people were familiar with it. Everyone knew that the state was total nonsense and that it was actually a comedy and a game.

Urza:

Yes, he was failing at what he was doing. And what's happening now is that it's encroaching on more and more fields and aspects of our lives, trying to control them, which means it's failing more. However, it's not a qualitative failure, but rather a quantitative one. Simply by being bigger, we see failure in more places. If the state were to start getting smaller, we would, in turn, feel that it is failing less.

Karel:

I understand. It's a function of how much the state has taken on. But the difference from the 1980s is that today it's worse - a large number of people, especially the younger generation, still trust the state. Under the communists, in that last phase, nobody believed in it anymore; it was just one big comedy. Today, a large part of the young believe that the state makes sense, that it does things well. Firstly, because they haven't had the experience yet, and also because they don't see how rotten and dysfunctional the structures are, this is an important aspect that people should be made aware of. It was especially evident during the COVID pandemic and the subsequent manipulations surrounding it. Young people immediately jumped on the bandwagon, believing everything because state institutions said so—and yet it was all one big lie.

Urza:

Again, you can discuss this further with young people. I don't want to generalise - people of all ages react differently. But on average, young people don't have that experience with the regime, and therefore they tend to trust the state more a priori. On the other hand, it is often easier to talk to them about it because they are more willing to think about it precisely. After all, they don't have patterns.

Additionally, it depends on the topic. For example, in the case of pensions, older people are more likely to believe than the young. They often already realise that pensions are a pyramid game, that they will not be able to afford their pensions and that something needs to be done about it. Whereas the older generation does not see it that way, and politicians try to convince them: Don't say that the state won't have enough money for pensions, that's bullshit. It is obvious. And so politicians are constantly trying to maintain that faith in the state.

Why today's technology puts us at the crossroads of civilisation

Karel:

What's next? What's next? I should reiterate that initially, you raised concerns about the intensity of the changes happening today, or at least implied it. However, I see today as a crossroads, where we must decide where we are going: whether we will follow the path of totalitarian control, with artificial intelligence and technology watching us, or whether, on the contrary, we can use artificial intelligence and technology as a shield to protect our freedom.

And that's why this time is crucial - unlike other moments in the past when people might also have said that this is when it's vital. It's not about political choices, of course, but about the direction of the times and development itself. And while people might have thought in the past that they were on the cusp of a fundamental change, today we have one particular factor in addition: technology, artificial intelligence. For me, this is a total transformation. It's comparable to the invention of writing - in terms of the possibilities for society, in terms of the contribution to efficiency, if we can get a good grip on it.

Urza:

I'm not disputing that we're standing at a crossroads; I'm just saying that the crossroads are not fundamentally different from the ones that people have stood at in the past. In every era, the people who have adopted the new technology have felt that it's very different now. And it seems unlikely that it can be different. Because if you look at history, every time a new technology came along, people felt the same way. And what's more likely? That we have that feeling now, and this time it's finally true, or that it's just the same feeling that all generations before us had?

Karel:

I argue that it's the former. And I have a simple argument for that. We can clearly see how technology can become a tool of total control - as seen in China. We've seen it here during the COVID pandemic. And it's straightforward: program something once and release it into the system. The difference with the past is that technology is not dying. If a totalitarian program is set up and continues to be policed, there is nothing anyone can do about it. It's not like before, when a dictator dies and his regime dies with him.

Urza:

No, it's about seeing it from your generation's perspective and not being able to take a step back and take a bird's-eye view.

Karel:

Well, that's what I'm trying to do, so I'm happy to take it.

Urza:

If you examine how people have reacted to technological change, it remains the same. For example, I read about the huge congress of the Catholic Church that banned the use of crossbows. The crossbow was the "weapon of the devil" back then. It allowed untrained people to kill a knight in armour. And that was the end of the world as people knew it. Before that, a knight in armour could only be defeated by another trained soldier. Suddenly, any villager could pick up a crossbow and kill a knight. It was a massive technological revolution.

Dnes nám to přijde směšné – vždyť je to jen kuše. Ale podobně to bylo i během průmyslové revoluce. Objevila se obava, že stroje vezmou lidem práci. Najednou manuální dělníky začaly nahrazovat stroje a vznikaly výzvy, že je potřeba stroje zničit. A co budou dělat lidé? A dnes máme roboty.

It was similar when nuclear weapons came along - suddenly, we had a means by which humanity could destroy itself. And until then, that wasn't true. But then, at some point, it became a reality.

Karel:

And that really was the turning point, because we've been lucky a few times not to destroy ourselves.

Urza:

However, the fact is that every significant change like that always introduces something that was previously absent.

Karel:

One of those changes brings balance, as no one really wants it yet.

Urza:

At the same time, each of those things brings something that was previously absent. And that's what the crossbows had. I'm deliberately giving the example of crossbows because we find them completely absurd today - after all, it's "just" a crossbow. But it was so fundamental to them at the time that they called great councils to decide what to do with crossbows, because it was impossible for an untrained peasant to kill a nobleman suddenly. They felt that their world was coming to an end and that if this were allowed to happen, the world as they knew it would cease to exist. And then we see this with every significant technological change - with machines that took away people's jobs, with nuclear weapons that could have wiped out humanity, and now with artificial intelligence.

Karel:

Yes, that's what I'm contradicting. With nuclear weapons, the potential and the risk that we will destroy ourselves is just there. With crossbows, it wasn't. With nuclear weapons, it is. And that risk will remain there until we dismantle them in some way. That's just a fact. It's now quasi-stable, although the situation may be deteriorating.

But with AI, it's one step further. Suppose someone starts using crossbows across the board - reality shifts and finds a new equilibrium. Whereas with AI, if, God forbid, China, for example, were to gain control of generalised AI, trigger it, and maintain power, it would be irreversible.

Urza:

However, even with the crossbows, it was irreversible; it just changed afterwards.

Karel:

Reality shifted, and a new equilibrium was established. And then came the tanks.

Urza:

Yes, exactly. And now the thing is, you don't know what comes after AI. If you look at it from the point of view of a person who lived at that time, you don't know what's going to happen after that. With crossbows, you didn't know that tanks were going to come one day or something like that. At the time, that was the change that was going to upend everything for you. Then, when the machines came along, nobody imagined that people would start doing a different type of work and move from agriculture to industry or services. Nobody could imagine it at that moment. Similarly, with nuclear weapons, a lot of people couldn't imagine that humanity would survive more than ten years.

Karel:

But the fact that there would be a kind of balancing - that one side would arm, the other side would arm, and that would maintain a kind of stability where both sides could destroy each other - people knew that from the beginning.

Urza:

However, many of them didn't believe it would happen. And many, if you were alive then, might have said to you, "Yes, there can be some stability, but all it takes is one nutcase who doesn't care that he dies and has enough power." And the thing is, when you live in that time, the new thing you don't know feels final, like everything is over.

Karel:

With the nuclear weapons, people perceived that. I'm not saying that everybody believed it, but the possibility of some quasi-stable system was at least not beyond their imagination.

Urza:

And that's not beyond imagination either.

What distinguishes current AI from accurate universal intelligence?

Karel:

And what is the solution?

Urza:

A solution to what?

Karel:

About AI. I would argue that if we - and it's certainly not impossible - jump into a system where the state starts deploying technologies that will watch over us, for example, similar to the ones they already planned to deploy during COVID, then this may already be something irreversible.

Urza:

Irreversible is everything.

Karel:

Irreversible in the sense that we would reach some local equilibrium - that is, an equilibrium that in this case would mean a totalitarianism that doesn't break down anymore. That could be guarded by technology ad infinitum.

Urza:

Nothing is permanent. Everything is ephemeral, and it will evolve in some way.

Karel:

In the context of our civilisation, in the context of our existence as a human society.

Urza:

Yes, many things can happen, but it's not the only possibility of evolution. We haven't seen other ways yet, especially since it's new to us. The children that are born today won't perceive this threat anymore - they'll be dealing with other things.

For them, AI won't be such a big deal because they'll already know how it all turned out. But it's not clear to us. Then, when you say that China will develop generalised AI, I see a contradiction there in the very premise.

Karel:

The risk is there.

Urza:

Yes. There's a variation of somebody creating a universal AI. So they'll make it, and they'll have control over it. However, if someone develops such an AI, it's challenging to maintain control over it.

The moment you create a general AI and give it access to resources, you can control it for a while. But I rather think not - certainly not after a long time. In the short term, yes, but the very fact that you create such a universal intelligence carries more risk than, say, China using it to establish global totalitarianism. Instead, the risk is that it gets entirely out of control and starts to pursue some goal that will be incomprehensible to us. And we will be like animals to it - not necessarily a nuisance, but rather something that exists.

Often in science fiction, it looks like the AI wants to exterminate humans. That's not necessary at all. It doesn't even have to say "we're going to exterminate humans"; it can just not care that we exist. She'll need specific resources that we currently lack - and that can become a problem. But she may not want to destroy us. It may be that she starts pursuing a completely different goal, like building pyramids out of rocks, because it makes sense to her. And we won't understand. Just as animals don't understand our goals, we may not understand the goals of a universal AI. And the question is, what would happen in such a world?

Another thing to consider is how far we are from achieving universal artificial intelligence. In my opinion—or based on what we know—it's still far away. The models are getting better, and they're amazing; you can do a lot of things with them. However, we don't know how far we are from achieving universal AI. It's like nuclear fusion - 50 years ago, it was supposed to be 20 years away; 20 years ago, it was supposed to be 20 years away; and today, it's still supposed to be 20 years away too. So universal AI may be the same thing. We can make significant advances, as has happened now, and yet in a hundred years, say it will be here in 20 years. But nobody knows this. The question is whether universal artificial intelligence can be produced at all. And if so, in how long?

Karel:

What is universal artificial intelligence anyway? Let's first describe the existing one. The current AI is a massive computation: all the data is combined and optimised through mathematical calculations. What is surprising to almost everyone and experts alike is how efficient and powerful it is. However, the actual principles and logic behind how it works are not particularly surprising.

Urza:

They aren't. But on the other hand, how specific models work is surprising. We understand the general principles underlying AI, but the individual models are already so complex that working with them—creating or modifying them—is more like an art than exact programming.

Karel:

It's not even model building in the classical sense. The mathematical approach is modelling - you make a model, then you optimise the parameters and so on. But the approach to AI is entirely different: you take all the data and "throw" learning algorithms at it, basically arbitrary ones. We are unable to determine exactly what is happening to the data. We can see the result it can produce.

Urza:

Considering that even the creators themselves don't fully understand exactly what AI does - we're surprised that it's this efficient - we don't really know how far it is from achieving universal AI because we have no idea why it works the way it does.

Karel:

We can only call something an accurate universal intelligence when it operates on entirely different principles - for example, quantum computers or biological computers, which are already being developed. As I see it, there needs to be an element of randomness, of stochastics, added —whether quantum or biological. It's probably not possible to achieve general intelligence using just the binary code of 0 and 1, which is the basis of current systems.

How can we use mathematics to prove the existence of a higher order

Urza:

And I don't know about that, because why would it depend on the platform?

Karel:

Binary code has the property that it is at least theoretically exactly predictable - you know exactly what the outcome will be, and there is clear causality.

Urza:

Wait, you can have a binary code that you attach to a device that supplies randomness to. Take something that plugs into the USB port of your computer. It'll generate random 0s and 1s - possibly based on how something breaks down within it, influenced by temperature or some other phenomenon. At that point, you're introducing an element of randomness, and it's still binary. So it depends on the platform. Intuitively, it seems more likely to be transferable. If you examine how a neuron works, it also doesn't operate purely in binary, but instead has a certain number of states. To me, it's just a matter of converting one system—binary—to another system. And I don't see why it should depend on the platform.

Karel:

However, there's an essential reason: if you're talking about a hypothetical quantum computer or biological computers, the stochastics are inherent in the very principle of data processing. It's not about the data itself now, it's about the fact that encoded right in the principle of processing is unpredictability.

Urza:

First of all, I wouldn't say "unpredictable"; instead, we can't predict them yet, and we don't know how to do it.

Karel:

If there is stochasticity - that is, quantum - then in the case of a quantum computer, it is the principle of randomness directly arising from quantum theory.

Urza:

Unless we're wrong about the physics, the point is that something like a new Newtonian physics can always come along and change our understanding. There's a difference between proving that something is actually unpredictable and just assuming that it's unexpected, but a discovery may come along that changes that. So theoretically, quantum states may be predictable

Karel:

Theoretically, we can say that from some further perspective.

Urza:

That's the first thing. And the second thing... after all, there's a difference between being deterministic or not. But it doesn't depend on the platform. You can have a binary computer to which you connect a device that generates random ones and zeros, and you obtain the same result as in biological or quantum machines. That's why the platform itself doesn't matter.

Karel:

It's a whole different level when you have randomness or stochastics right in the data. Because what is our brain? Then we can discuss what thinking is, what our consciousness is, and where free will comes into play - if it exists at all. Is it directly in the processing, or is it somewhere else? And if it is indeed in the process, then our processing is not binary. That's closer to, say, a quantum or biological computer versus a binary one. So I see a qualitative difference there. However, I also understand your counterargument.

Urza:

I still only see a quantitative difference there, not a qualitative one. Respectively, I would see a qualitative difference between a deterministic binary and a non-deterministic biological system. But I only see a quantitative difference between a non-deterministic binary and a non-deterministic biological one, not a qualitative one. A biological or quantum computer can perform computations faster because it will be parallelised. But a binary one with a non-deterministic generator attached can do the same thing - just slower.

Karel:

However, the quantum computer introduces a random error that the deterministic one theoretically doesn't have. So the difference is there. And now, of course, the philosophical question is: when random errors are introduced into the system, what does that actually mean? It opens up a space, a potential for something higher.

For example, I see our world and our existence as a space that I call "transcendent potential" - the potential for basically everything possible. From it, we consciously choose; we can liken it to the collapse of a quantum function, and in doing so, we actually create reality. Along with the way we each create our reality, I also perceive that we are a projection of what I call global consciousness. We are, in a sense, separate beings, but in another sense not so much.

And it is in our actions, in the way we create reality and ideally choose freely, that synchronicities emerge - things that are beyond randomness. People tend to start synchronically working on the same things without knowing why. For example, some people are driven by instinct and suddenly discover that, together, they create something unexpected. These are the effects of synchronicities. And they arise, I think, from the existence of some "higher mind" or "higher program" that naturally leads us to cooperate. And that is what would be missing if these were just purely deterministic computers.

Urza:

But I don't actually know. I understand what you described as two parts. The first was about interconnection, and the second was about synchronicity.

In terms of interconnection, I share the same sentiment. However, it's more a matter of my intuition, which I can't justify or logically defend in any way. It's just a feeling.

Karel:

Then I can explain it to you mathematically.

Urza:

It's a feeling of mine, and I see the world that way. But I certainly wouldn't say that the world is like that. I like it, and it corresponds to my experience.

But as far as synchronicity goes, I have big question marks there—two in particular. The first is that it's hard to distinguish synchronicity from confirmation bias. Because the point is that yes, you can see some synchronicities, but you can see them precisely because you interpret them that way.

Karel:

I studied probability theory, so I'm familiar with all this.

Urza:

So you don't really know what you're picking out of what you're seeing, because you don't know the whole state space. You notice the interesting things, which is logical, but you don't know how much of the state space you're picking from. That's the first thing. I'm not saying it's disproven, I'm just offering this perspective.

And then the second thing about synchronicities. I think some things are lawful, but we don't know the laws yet. For example, I really liked an idea that an anthropologist had who studied how different civilisations that never knew each other discovered new things. And he found that they learned them in much the same way. We don't know that today because we're too globalised and we influence each other, but he was looking at tribes in, for example, Australia, South America, and various other places. And he found that they made technological advances in very similar ways.

He concluded - although he didn't have the scientific basis for it - that if a second civilisation similar to ours had arisen and lived in similar conditions, they would have discovered things in the same order. For example, electromagnetic fields and other discoveries, in the exact sequence that we know them. There's a reason why, after a certain amount of knowledge, the next step is offered.

And whether it's due to some higher consciousness and synchronicity, or how the human brain and the world itself work, is another question.

Karel:

Excellent, I totally agree. I'll tell you my story of how it developed for me. I was deeply convinced of the reality of pure randomness by adulthood, for example, through a materialistic approach to the world. And I considered people who thought otherwise to be victims of confirmation bias and similar distortions.

However, based on my own observations, I eventually concluded that it was all just too much. I started testing synchronicity - personally, just for myself - and concluded that these things are beyond random. And I say this knowing that I have a statistics background, so that I can see into it. For me, it was a clear conclusion: synchronicities are not purely random. This is my personal experience, which I arrived at through systematic observation.

But what I found in mathematics is absolutely fantastic. I'm going to give a talk about it at a university in America this fall, titled 'Art in Mathematics or God's Signature in Numbers.' There are phenomena in mathematics that statistically suggest the existence of a higher order behind our logical thinking and rationality. Some structures cannot be explained by pure chance.

Indeed, the origin of the world can be explained by pure chance - given enough experiments, even a negligibly probable event will happen someday. That's Hawking's explanation, for example: if there are enough experiments, everything may one day "happen" to come together correctly. However, in mathematics, I discover artistic structures that are akin to "chance squared" - ones that can no longer be simply the result of chance.

And importantly, I came to those conclusions through a systematic approach, not data selection bias. After I verified for myself that things are not purely random, my paradigm began to break down. Not that it was slightly wrong, but it was utterly wrong. Suddenly I thought: "Wow, this world is totally different from what I thought it was until I was 34." And I started to explore what it was like.

The first thing that came to mind was some interesting numbers. If it's not purely coincidental, I'll try to look at the numbers from a different perspective. I took the number 12 - a special number, perhaps in decadic structures. And the number 21 began to appear systematically. In 2016, at the Colours of Ostrava, I said publicly that 21 is "the number of our universe". It was an exaggeration, but I meant it sincerely. And then, out of sample, other connections started to emerge, some of which I only learned about later, like Sheldon's sentence, and all of those connections were fascinating.

And when I did the math, the probability of something like that arising by chance was on the order of 10-²¹. That's an absolutely negligible probability. And to me, that's statistical proof that there's something higher at work in our existence.

Urza:

But do you know how big the state space you were traversing actually is?

Karel:

Exactly, nothing was going on. It was all straight and I'll explain it in more detail sometime. It's definitely not a statistical fraud. I want to discuss this further sometime, as it's an interesting topic.

Anyway, to wrap this up, the math guys are stuck on the numbers. But I stand by the fact that what can be found in mathematics indicates, or even statistically proves, the existence of some higher principle. And that, for me, is the reason - something that helped me come to what I call a belief in the meaning of our existence. That our existence has a higher purpose than pure chance. And this is a powerful argument for me.

Why learning itself is the most significant reason to live

Urza:

I actually agree with you - I believe in something similar and share your feelings. I don't completely agree with the conclusion. I agree with what you're saying in a way, though not with the process by which you arrived at it.

Karel:

I've made the process even simpler because we don't have any more time. But in any case, if we accept faith in the meaning of our existence, that is, faith in the meaningfulness of what we do, in the meaningfulness of the good, that's a great thing. It allows us a particular perspective and naturalness. We can then take what is complicated or unpleasant, as our school in a sense, and have hope that there is a good chance that it will turn out well in the end. In other words, as Václav Havel said: What we do is meaningful, if only because of the chance.

Urza:

And for me, primarily because of the teaching you just talked about. Because for me, the learning alone is reason enough to do these things.

Karel:

Absolutely. It makes sense to go into discomfort for the sake of learning, knowing and understanding.

Urza:

Exactly. For me, even if there's no higher purpose, the process of learning is worth it.

Karel:

Yes, the feeling itself—the awareness of knowing—is worth it. And that is the value in itself.

Urza:

Even if I die afterwards and I don't get to pass on everything I've learned to anyone, the experience alone is worthwhile.

Karel:

Which is the argument of meaningfulness, yes. But even narrower. The numbers argument - there you're talking about some higher principle, that our existence can have other effects. And what are those impacts? It could be that we, as a collective consciousness, want to learn and know ourselves. That's why we're going through this school, this crazy game.

Whatever it is, it's a great game and I enjoy it a lot. We want to be successful in this game. And success means that we, as people, can understand each other, connect, and work together with freedom as a fundamental axiom.

And at the same time - and this is where we don't entirely agree - I believe that right now is a defining moment, thanks in part to artificial intelligence. I'm not saying that I'm going to dramatise this to the end, but this time is so special that it's really decisive - one way or the other.

Urza:

That moment is special, but at the same time, other moments have been memorable. I would put it this way.

Karel:

It has something extra in it, but I understand that it can be understood both ways.

Urza:

I guess so. But at the same time, the previous ones had something extra in them again compared to the earlier ones. Each of them was the first in its own way due to certain aspects. And I agree that this one also has aspects that are first.

Karel:

Maybe, I see it here, that the next chapter of our cognition and evolution will already be on a galactic level. There's a good chance that we'll see something else.

Urza:

And, in some aspects, this point is undoubtedly the first, as these aspects are being included for the first time. However, at the same time, there were several points before that where some aspects were also introduced first.

Karel:

Right. Those previous points brought about radical changes. AI will also bring about radical changes. And the change I expect is that we will go further, beyond Earth, into the next phase. However, that's more a reflection of what's going to happen.

Urza:

That would be interesting. I'm looking forward to that.

Karel:

I'm looking forward to that, and we'll see.

Urza:

Hopefully, we'll live to see it.

Karel:

I'm optimistic about this. Anyway, it definitely makes sense to me to do things that align with what we believe in - the principles of freedom and so on. And even if it doesn't end up being that way, it still makes the most sense to me.

Urza:

I agree with that. Because the process itself is enough for me. The method of creating, knowing, and learning is more important than what it brings explicitly because the experience itself is a reward in itself.

Karel:

Thank you for the interview.

Dear readers, if you want to learn more about Urza and his activities, check out Freeport or urza.cz.